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Abstract
The ability to predict the consequences of one’s behavior in a particular environment is a mechanism for adaptation.
In the absence of any cost to this activity, we might expect agents to choose behaviors that maximize their fitness, an
example of directed innovation. This is in contrast to blind mutation, where the probability of becoming a new
genotype is independent of the fitness of the new genotypes. Here, we show that under environments punctuated
by rapid reversals, a system with both genetic and cultural inheritance should not always maximize fitness through
directed innovation. This is because populations highly accurate at selecting the fittest innovations tend to over-fit
the environment during its stable phase, to the point that a rapid environmental reversal can cause extinction. A less
accurate population, on the other hand, can track long term trends in environmental change, keeping closer to the
time-average of the environment. We use both analytical and agent-based models to explore when this mechanism is
expected to occur.
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Introduction
One of the distinguishing features of biological evolution is the
production of adaptation through natural selection on blind
variation [1]. A vast amount of theory and empirical work has
been dedicated to this topic, stemming from the earliest works of
Fisher [2] and other classical population geneticists (e.g. [3,4]).
However, this mechanism is not the only method by which
adaptation can be produced.
Population genetics is fairly sparse on the subject of directed
adaptation, or the overproduction of new phenotypes that adapt
the organism well to the current environment. This is, of course,
because genetic mutation is blind. However, the behavioral
innovations of some animals are not necessarily blind. Some
animals can predict the consequences of their actions within their
environment, which increases their probability of choosing a
behavior or innovation among a large pool of possibilities that fit
them well to the current environment. These behaviors can then
be transmitted via cultural inheritance to the next generation.
Thus they can adapt behaviorally in a directed way.
Intuitively, we can believe that such directedness promotes the
maintanence of high fitness. In fact, the scholarly work on the
capacity for predicting the consequences of our actions is littered
with optimistic statements, going all the way back to Malthus, who
spoke of:
‘‘…that distinctive superiority in [human] reasoning faculties,
which enables [them] to calculate distant consequences’’ [5].
The intution that being able to predict the consequences of
one’s actions is good for fitness remain today in the works of most
authors on this topic (e.g. [6,7] and comments in [7]). For
example, D’Argembeau in a comment to [7] says:
‘‘S&C [Suddendorf and Corballis] argues that the primary
fitness function of mental time travel is to enhance biological
fitness in the future: Mentally simulating various versions of the
future, and their respective consequences, enables one to act
flexibly in the present to increase one’s future survival chances. We
completely agree…’’
The reasoning seems to be that agents with the ability to predict
the consequences of their action in the environment can choose
the best possible action out of the pool of all possible actions, and
thereby increase its adaptedness, and therefore its fitness.
However, these predictions ignore the effects of environmental
fluctuations, including sudden changes in fitness optima, which
often have counterintuitive consequences for evolution [8,9]. One
would like a more rigorous argument of when the directedness of
innovations is advantageous, as well as quantitative predictions of
just how advantageous [10]. After all, it is reasonable to assume
that the capacity for directed innovation increases with brain size,
which is expensive in terms of energy [11], obstetric difficulties
[12], and a long childhood [13]. A clearer theoretical understand-
ing would allow us to predict trade-offs involving directed
innovation, as well as the situations in which directed innovation
can be more, or less, important.
Here, we derive a scenario where maximizing one’s accuracy in
choosing the fittest innovation in the current environment can be
detrimental. The systems we study are those with dual inheritance
[14], where the parent is able to pass on both genes as well as
learned behavior. Our approach is based on the intuition that
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can overfit environmental change. This possibility has already
occurred to Darwin, who wrote that
‘‘If animals became adapted to every minute change, they
would not be fitted to the slow great changes really in progress.’’
[15].
Thus, agents who are capable of assessing the consequences of
their own actions in the immediate environment, but who are
incapable of forecasting the changes of the environment, might be
thrown off by environmental noise rather than adapting
themselves to long term trends or time-averages. We more
specifically show how the occurrence of sudden changes in the
environment can limit the degree of directed innovation. We first
provide an intuitive description of this scenario. We then present a
formal analytical treatment, and finally we report results from an
agent-based simulation applied to a historical example to which
our scenario might apply.
Models and Results
Toy model
Let us begin with an oversimplified toy model in order to
formalize this intuition. Consider an environment, characterized
by a single parameter E that varies around a certain mean. In fact,
let us consider a very particular type of environment, where E
slowly increases over a long period of time, then quickly reverses
and crashes (see Figure 1).
Let’s say there are two agents exposed to E and there is a pool of
actions from which each of the agents can choose. Different
actions alter their fitness in response to E. However, the pair of
agents differ in their ability to assess the consequences of any
particular action in the environment. We call the one who can
assess better the ‘‘accurate’’ agent and the one who assess less well
the ‘‘inaccurate’’ agent. Note that this is not yet a model of
evolution, rather of competition between two agents who do not
die. The competition is based on how well the agents learn from
the environment.
We model the capacity for directed innovation as the average
reduction of the distance between individual fitness and the fitness
optimum following each innovation. This is intutively reasonable
because the agents who can assess better can change its behavior
to be more in tune with changes in the environment, and hence
produce better adaptations. The inaccurate agent, on the other
hand, cannot adapt its behavior to environmental change so well.
Consider the case where the inaccurate agent is so poor that, on
average, its innovations cannot even track the enviromental
changes during the phase of slow increase in , and remain near the
long term environmental mean despite the slow environmental
change. Thus, for the period of slow environmental change, the
accurate agent will do better. However, when the environment
rapidly reverses, the accurate agent might in fact do worse. It
might do worse because it fits the previous change so well that the
rapid reversal meant the environment moved further away from its
optimum than the optimum of the inaccurate agent, which had
stayed near the environmental mean.
We can reason out the conditions allowing inaccurate types to
maintain a higher long-term fitness than accurate types. First of all,
if the accurate agent is able to perfectly adapt to the phase of rapid
enviromental change, then it will always have a higher fitness than
the inaccurate agent. The perfect strategy for agents is to perfectly
track the environment. However, this strategy is impossible if
environment changes so rapidly in its rapid phase as to escape the
capacity of both types of agents to adapt.
Secondly, the environment must possess a strong central
tendency and be varying about some longer-term mean, or trend,
since if its rapid phase is in the same direction as the slow phase,
then the accurate agent will be superior. Finally, the fitness
function must be non-linear in the sense that the cost to the
accurate agent after the rapid environmental reversal must
outweigh the fitness advantage it has accumulated over the period
of slow environmental change.
The first assumption, that perfect adaptation is impossible,
seems to be a reasonable one in view of how the environment
changes at all scales of time. It is impossible for organisms to adjust
themselves to every minute change that occurs with great rapidity.
The second one also seems reaonable, since most environmental
conditions do vary about a certain mean, although whether they
change slowly in one direction and then quickly in another
depends on the scenario at hand, and we will give an example in
the final section.
The third assumption is more subtle. Superficially, it already
seems quite reasonable, since most fitness curves are convex near
the optimum [16–19]. The usual theoretical curve used here is a
gaussian curve, so both theoretically as well as empirically the
fitness drops more precipitously as the agent’s phenotype moves
away from the enviromental optimum. Thus, a short moment of
severe maladaptation can strongly outweight long periods of
relative better adaptation. On the other hand, a more subtle
Figure 1. An artificial environment used by the agent based model. E(t) represents the environmental value at time t.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026770.g001
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necessary, although a strong curvature makes the less accurate
type much more likely to be more fit. This is due to the well-known
principle that natural selection maximizes the geometric mean
fitness over time, not the arithmetic mean [20–23]. Thus, while
maximizing fitness, natural selection also minimizes variance in
fitness over time, and since the worst fitness of the accurate agent is
worse than the worst fitness of the inaccurate agent, the accurate
agent accrues more variance in its fitness, lowering its geometric
mean fitness over time.
We next construct an analytical model to provide a formal
theory of maladaptive directed innovation under sudden environ-
mental changes.
Analytical model
The above section describes a toy model in which maximizing
the fitness of each decision may not be an optimal strategy when
the environment changes slowly in one direction for long periods
and then rapidly reverses. This can be illustrated with a numerical
example. Consider a simple cyclical environment with cycle 4 that
looks like the following: E(t)~f0,1,2,{1,0,1,2,{1,:::g, where t
indicates the timestep.
Consider two agents, A and B, where A is more accurate than
B. Due to greater accuracy, A can adapt to the environment more
quickly than B by choosing better actions. Let us say, for example,
A can change its optimal phenotype by a maximum of xA~1 per
time step in the direction that will take its phenotype closer to the
environmental optimum. B, on the other hand, is incapable of
choosing so well and xB~0:5. Let both agents be perfectly
adapted to the enviroment initially, and let w(t) be the phenotype
of the agent at time t. The phenotype is measured as the
environment to which the organism is best adapted. We thus set
E(0)~wA(0)~wB(0)~0.
We give the first few entries of the sequence of E(t), wA(t), and
wB(t) for clarity:
E(t)~f0, 1, 2, {1, 0, 1,:::g
wA(t)~f0, 1, 2, 1, 0, 1,:::g
wB(t)~f0, 0:5, 1, 0:5, 0, 0:5,:::g
We introduce the fitness curve
l~
1
jE(t){w(t)j
cz1
ð1Þ
where c is a tunable parameter. This fitness curve looks a great
deal like a Gaussian curve, but is easier to compute with (Figure
S1, see Information S1). c controls the rate at which the curve falls
off as jE(t){w(t)j increases; a greater c means a sharper threshold
of jE(t){w(t)j at which fitness falls off precipitously.
It turns out that B is more fit than A for cw3:238:::. In fact, the
existence of some critical cc is true in general; for similar
environments and fitness curves, then an agent B with less
foresight than agent A will be more fit than agent A if c is large
than some cc (see Information S1). Moreover, we can show that for
any such environment (such as the one in Figure S2), agents
behave cyclically and there is an intermediate value of x which is
locally optimal for any c. (See Figure S3, Information S1).
Agent-based model
Our model of directed innovation differs from models of blind
mutation. In blind models, mutations themselves do not take the
agent closer to the environmental mean. Any movement towards
the environmental mean is due to the differential effects of natural
selection. In the above analytical model, however, the directed
movement is purely due to the capacity of the agent to choose, on
average, an innovation that takes it closer to the environment. The
previous model is not a model of evolution. We did not include
variance in innovations and there was no reproduction or
selection.
The analytical model shows that agents with less directedness
can be more fit than agents with more directedness. In order to
make the model evolutionary, we extend the above analytical
model with a dual inheritance agent-based model, where the
agent’s behavior begins as being learned (culturally inherited) from
its parent, then changes according to its genetically determined
capacity to learn from the environment, which is genetically
inherited from the parent. This allows us to evaluate the likelihood
of mutating off the local optimum, severity of conditions required
on c (if any), robustness to drift effects, limited population sizes,
and the applicability of this theoretical scenario to the real world.
We confirm that the intermediate accuracy under the conditions
described by the analytical model is a robust prediction under
these scenarios.
In the agent-based model, as in the analytical model, individual
agents have a phenotypic value (w) that represents their adaptation
to an environment. The environment is uniform with one
dimension of variability described by E(t). At each time step,
behavioral innovations become available. Agents can adopt or
refuse these innovations and as a result move their phenotype
closer or farther away from the environmental optimum,
increasing or decreasing their fitness. Agents have a second trait
(x) that represents their probability of knowing how behavioral
innovations will affect them. Accurate agents (higher x) are better
at determining whether any behavioral innovation will move their
phenotypic value closer to the current environmental value.
Inaccurate agents have lower x. Agents adopt the behavioral
innovation if and only if they can determine that it is beneficial.
The probability of adoption is xPb, where Pb is the probability
that a new behavior is beneficial. Agents reject the behavioral
innovation if they are unable to determine whether it is beneficial,
or if they determine it to be harmful. The assumption that new
behaviors are always rejected if agents cannot foresee their
consequences reduces the noise in simulation results. Otherwise
inaccurate agents would have a great range of fitnesses (depending
on what behaviors they adopt by chance), and these fitnesses
would be independent of their foresight. This essentially turns the
model into one of blind mutation, which we would like to avoid.
Consider N agents over the time period ½0,T , and the
environment changes as E(t). Each agent i is defined by two
parameters, fwi,xig, where wi is the environment that i is adapted
to, and xi is the probability that agent i can assess the
consequences of adopting a behavioral innovation, that is, whether
the new behavior will move the agent closer or farther from the
environmental optimum. At each timestep, there is a probability,
finnov, that a new behavior will be available for adoption. This
behavior will increase or decrease wi by sinnov with equal
probability (so Pb~0:5) if adopted by any given agent. sinnov thus
gives an upper bound to the maximum rate of adaptation to the
current environment.
At each timestep, N agents are chosen with replacement for
update. During each update, agent i survives with the probability
Fitness-Enhancing Innovations Can Be Detrimental
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jE(t){w(t)j
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ð2Þ
We used survival instead of reproductive fitness to increase
simulation speed, but preserve the same qualitative behavior of the
fitness curves [24]. The dynamics of the model are robust to
implementation scheme; for example, a random agent can be
chosen to replicate with this fitness, pushing out another random
agent.
In our implementation, if agent i does not survive, a random
agent j (not including i) is chosen from the population to
reproduce. Its progeny then replaces i. Thus, a new agent i ,a
progeny of agent j, replaces the agent i that has just died. The new
agent i  is very similar to j with small modifications. Specifically,
wi ~wj, which is an act of cultural transmission (the passage of a
learned behavior from parent to progeny), and xi ~xjzh, an act
of genetic transmission with mutation, where h[½{s,s , a uniform
distribution. xi  is a probability that is kept bounded between 0
and 1. We do not allow mutations in the culturally learned
behavior because we wish for all movement of the phenotype
towards the environmental mean to be a result of directed
innovations by choice of the agents, rather than blind chance and
selection.
If agent i survives and a new behavior is available, it has xi
chance of accurately assessing whether the new behavior will take
it closer to the environmental optimum. If it assesses successfully,
and the new behavior moves the agent closer to the environment,
then it adopts the behavior and modifies its wi. Else it does not
adopt the new behavior. This is how we model directed
innovations.
We tested the model with a variety of environments. We report
the results with an artificial environment (Figure 1) and one based
on the Vostok ice core data [25,26] (see next Section). In order to
make the different environments comparable, we normalize them
so the the minimum environmental value is 0 and the maximum
environmental value is 1. We examine a range of c’s and we note
the minimum c value for which the agents settle into an
intermediate, rather than a maximal ability to foresee the
consequences of new behaviors. For all simulations,
N~10000,finnov~0:1,sinnov~0:005,s~0:01. For the artificial
environment presented in Figure 1, predicted x values are
independent of initial conditions for all c§6. The results for
c~5,c~6,c~10 are presented in Figure 2. As expected from the
analytical model, for large enough c (cw6)agents do not evolve to
maximum possible foresight. Each sudden environmental reversal
will favour anew the inaccurate agents.
This result depends on the assumption that even maximum
foresight is not sufficient to perfectly track the environment during
the sudden reversal. If perfect tracking was possible, the agents
that could perfectly track would necessarily be the most fit. We
argued in our Introduction that the inability to perfectly track the
environment during sudden environmental changes is a reason-
able assumption, and we will return to this assumption in the
Discussion.
The main differences between the agent-based and the
analytical models presented here are the dissociation between x
and w, and limited population size introduced in the agent-based
model. If the environment slowly rises in one direction for too
long, or if c is too small, then all agents with low x die before the
onset of sudden environmental change, in which case high x
dominates, or the population goes extinct (which is prevented in
this model). The minimum c values needed to generate
intermediate optimal x from the model means that we need a
fitness curve that drops off quickly when the distance between the
phenotype and the environmental optimum reaches a threshold.
This way, inaccurate agents can survive until the catastrophic
event (since they do not cross that threshold), but the catastrophic
event is sufficient to kill off most of the accurate agents (since they
do cross that threshold). Thus, although the analytical model
predicts a locally optimal x for all c, a minimum c is required in
the agent-based model to observe a local optimum.
Agent-based modeling using the Vostok ice core data
The artificial environment we use in the previous section can be
argued to be too artificial; the rise and the fall are both clean of
noise and the sudden reversal might be too sudden and too quick
to be realistic. To address this issue, we insert a more realistic
timeseries in the form of the Vostok ice core data [25,26]. This
data indicates that the temperature environment over the last 400
000 years has been characterized by rapid deglaciation events,
interspersed across periods of slower cooling and cold plateaus. We
test whether this could result in an intermediate, locally optimal
adaptive rate. We replace our artificial environment with the
Vostok ice core data (Figure 3), where each timestep counts for a
Figure 2. Intermediate adaptive rate (x) is optimal for agents in
the environment of Figure 1. Brightness denotes density of agents.
From top to bottom: c~5,c~6,c~10. All other parameters are identical
(see text for more details). Initial conditions: E(0)~wi(0)~0,xi[½0,1 .
The results are independent of initial conditions. Note how the larger
the gamma, the stronger the movement to intermediate, rather than
maximal, accuracy.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026770.g002
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model. Even c~5 in this model favored agents of moderate or
even low ability to foresee the consequences of adopting different
behaviors (Figure 4). As expected, the effect increases with
increasing c.
The first significant period of change is a rapid glaciation
400kya that causes inaccurate agents to have a fitness advantage.
Four rapid deglaciation events 350kya, 250kya, 150kya, and a last
one in the past 20ky, all allow low inaccurate agents to persist for
long periods. In other words, there is an advantage to reducing the
overall ability of the agents to discriminate between beneficial and
harmful innovations under these circumstances. We believe that a
large range of environmental variables display this pattern of slow
movement in one direction interspersed with catastrophic
reversals, which potentiates the type of scenario described in this
paper. Natural disasters, for example, might happen quickly,
followed by long and slow periods of recovery.
Discussion
In this paper, we show a somewhat counterintuitive point that
agents which can best assess the consequences of their actions in
the current environment can nevertheless be at a fitness
disadvantage relative to less accurate competitors. We reason that
the ability of agents to predict the consequences of their actions in
a given environment acts like a greedy algorithm; it constantly tries
to optimize for the moment. In the cases reported here, the greedy
algorithm fails because the accurate agent over-optimizes for the
immediate present, and so fails to track the long term average of
the environment.
Several veins of earlier theoretical work shed light on these
results. The first is the work on optimal rates of mutation (e.g. [27–
30]). Another related line is natural selection and mutation rates in
changing environments (e.g. [21,31,32]). The first body of work
established that in the majority of cases, a low or zero mutation
rate is preferable since the vast majority of mutations are
deterimental. The fact that mutation rates are not zero is likely
due to the physiological cost of increasing copying fidelity ([30]),
especially in sexual beings where the hitchhiking of alleles that
increases mutation rate to beneficial alleles is broken by
recombination. The second line of work established the manner
in which environments must change in order to maintain genetic
variability (e.g. [32]). These results, however, are primarily focused
on blind mutations. Directed innovations, where a larger
proportion of change might be beneficial, require a different sort
of analysis.
The closest work focuses on the evolution of individual learning
(e.g. [8,9,14,33]). The evolution of learning from the environment
is strongly related to this work, since this type of learning (as
opposed to social learning from other agents) can be seen as the act
of choosing new behaviors with feedback from the environment.
Most of this work, however, has focused on the evolution of the
capacity for culture. A recent result that studies learning in
variable environments, for example, showed that in a stable
environment punctuated by sharp bouts of change, agents stop
learning from the environment during the stable periods and
instead opt to choose to learn from each other. When the
environment does change, the agents can no longer learn from the
environment and may go extinct [9]. Our work instead focuses
purely on the dynamics of the evolution of learning from the
environment and on the optimal rates of such learning. Previous
work assumed that better capacity for learning, if costless in other
fitness terms such as time and energy, would likely lead to
improvement of agent fitness, although our results have been
foreseen by [34], who realized that changes in environmental
conditions can lead to a reduction of learning.
Figure 3. The Vostok ice core data. Long periods of cooling are
punctuated by rapid deglaciation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026770.g003
Figure 4. Agent discrimination ability using the Vostok ice core
data. From top to bottom: c~5,c~6,c~10. Notice how discriminatory
ability rises during periods of slow change, but falls each time there is a
rapid reversal.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026770.g004
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learning done by the parent generation is passed on to the progeny
through cultural transmission, and the capacity to learn further
from the environment is passed on through genetic transmission.
The model also contains three key simplifying assumptions that
allow for analytical tractability and increase the generality of our
results. First is that agents cannot fully adapt to the environment
using directed innovation when environmental change is at its
quickest. This, we argue, is reasonable. The environment
fluctuates on every timescale; even organisms with learning cannot
adapt to every change. In the absence of prior adaptation, the
maximum rate of environmental change during a volcanic
eruption, for example, must be very quick indeed and no cognitive
capacity is likely to cope with it in an optimal way. A recent review
of the evolution literature [35] falls in very neatly with this
assumption, that the environment constantly exerts considerable
selection pressure on organisms, but with many changes in
direction and with longer trends of change that proceed at a much
slower pace.
The second assumption is that agents are incapable of
forecasting the environment. Forecasting denotes agents’ knowl-
edge of the future environment. If there are agents with good
environmental forecasting abilities who can know the environment
many timesteps in advance, they can preadapt and nullify these
theoretical predictions. Future explorations will allow us to
understand the sensitivity of this model to forecasting. However,
we expect our results to be robust to some amounts of forecasting,
which would be consistent with overall difficulty of predicting
environmental fluctuations.
The third assumption of the model is that agents are incapable
of remembering or reusing behavioral innovations they adopted in
the past. This assumption is implicit in the fact that the agents’
directed rates of adaptation are the same in any direction, whether
or not they previously explored that parameter range. This
assumption is realistic for many animal species using only limited
forms of social learning, so behavioral innovations gained by
ancestors are forgotten as quickly as they become unfit. The
assumption holds when there is no repertoire of past behavior
from which the current generation can draw to deal with
environmental conditions that occurred in the past.
We make the important caveat that we do not believe that the
evolution of directed innovation, particularly in the vastly more
complex system of humans, in fact occurred in the way we
describe it here. Too many parameters, including the three
assumptions stated above: the maximum rate of directed
innovation, the existence of memory and forecasting abilities,
remain unknown. We have, however, stated a theoretical
possibility with clear and general implications. It can potentially
provide insights into the cultural evolution of many animal species.
Future work will provide more quantitative predictions that can be
directly tested for particular species, cultural systems and
environmental regimes.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 An example fitness curve for c=4,E=0,and w
from 25 to 5. It is very similar to the normal distribution curve
but is easier to compute.
(TIFF)
Figure S2 The environment used in the analytical
model. The environment increases in discrete steps of 1 each
timestep for c timesteps, then drops to 0 in a single time step.
(TIFF)
Figure S3 Agent behavior in this environment over the
first cycle. Dashed lines and diamonds indicate the phenotype of
the agent, solid lines and circles the environment. The particlular x
(maximum rate of phenotypic change) used here is x=0.5, but
changing x will only change the amplitude of the cycle, not its
phase or frequency.
(TIFF)
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